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Abstract
Detecting anomalous inputs is critical for safely deploying deep learning models
in the real world. Existing approaches for detecting out-of-distribution (OOD)
examples work well when evaluated on natural samples drawn from a sufficiently
different distribution than the training data distribution. However, in this paper,
we show that existing detection mechanisms can be extremely brittle when evalu-
ating on inputs with minimal adversarial perturbations which don’t change their
semantics. Formally, we introduce a novel and challenging problem, Robust Out-
of-Distribution Detection, and propose an algorithm that can fool existing OOD
detectors by adding small perturbations to the inputs while preserving their se-
mantics and thus the distributional membership. We take a first step in solving
this challenge, and propose an effective algorithm called ALOE, which performs
robust training by exposing the model to both adversarially crafted inlier and outlier
examples. Our method can be flexibly combined with, and render existing meth-
ods robust. On common benchmark datasets, we show that ALOE substantially
improves the robustness of state-of-the-art OOD detection, with 58.4% AUROC
improvement on CIFAR-10 and 46.59% improvement on CIFAR-100. Finally, we
provide theoretical analysis for our method, further justifying the empirical results
above.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models typically perform well when the training and testing data are sampled
independently and identically from the same distribution. However, models in deployment can fail
in catastrophic ways when the test data distribution differs from the distribution of the training data.
In particular, high-capacity neural networks can wrongly classify inputs from unknown classes (i.e.,
out-of-distribution) into known classes with high confidence, which could have extremely high cost.
For example, a traffic sign classification model used for autonomous driving systems may predict
label "speed-limit-100" with high confidence for an anomalous scene without any traffic sign.
This can trigger wrong actions for the car and cause unanticipated and potentially catastrophic events.
Therefore, detecting autonomous OOD examples has recently been recognized as an important
building block for trustworthy AI (Amodei et al., 2016).
Several previous works address this problem by relying on the raw softmax score (Hendrycks &
Gimpel, 2016), the calibrated softmax score (Liang et al., 2017; Guo et al., 2017), or the Mahalanobis
distance based confidence score (Lee et al., 2018) derived from a neural network. These approaches
have been demonstrated to work well when evaluated on OOD images that are sampled from a
sufficiently different distribution than the training distribution. However, in this paper, we argue about
their inadequacy of their evaluation methods, and demonstrate that we can adversarially construct
images by adding minimal semantic-preserving perturbations which can cause failure in existing
OOD detectors.
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Formally, we introduce a novel and challenging problem called robust out-of-distribution detection.
We show that existing OOD detection algorithms can be easily attacked to produce mistaken OOD
prediction under small adversarial perturbations (Papernot et al., 2016; Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al., 2013). Specifically, we construct adversarial test examples by
adding minimal perturbations so to change the model confidence in the reverse direction. We generate
adversarial in-distribution examples such that the model is induced to produce low confidence scores;
whereas adversarial OOD examples are constructed to induce the model to produce high confidence
scores. Different from the common notion, the adversarial examples in our work are meant to fool
the OOD detectors, rather than the original image classification model. It is also worth noting that the
perturbation is sufficiently small so that the visual semantics as well as true distributional membership
remain the same. Yet worryingly, state-of-the-art OOD detectors can fail to distinguish the samples
under such adversarial attacks. Scant attention has been paid to making the OOD detectors robust
against minimal input perturbations.
To address the challenge , we propose an effective method, ALOE, that improves the robust OOD
detection performance. Specifically, we perform robust training by exposing the model to two types
of perturbed adversarial examples. For in-distribution training data, we create a perturbed example
by searching in its -ball that maximizes the negative log likelihood. In addition, we also utilize an
auxiliary unlabaled dataset as in Hendrycks et al. (2018), and create corresponding perturbed outlier
example by searching in its -ball that maximizes the KL-divergence between model output and a
uniform distribution. The overall training objective of ALOE can be viewed as an adversarial min-max
game. We show that on several benchmark datasets, ALOE can improve the robust OOD detection
performance by up to 58.4% compared to previous state-of-the-art method. Our approach can be
complemented by techniques such as ODIN (Liang et al., 2017), and further boost the performance.
We provide analysis and theoretical intuitions for our method. We show that training with perturbed
examples from the unlabeled data helps calibrate the error on outliers from an unseen distribution,
as long as the unlabeled data distribution and the new outlier distribution have a small divergence
with-respect-to (w.r.t.) the hypothesis.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We identify a novel and challenging out-of-distribution detection problem: the OOD de-
tectors should be robust to minimal semantic-preserving input perturbations. We find that
state-of-the-art OOD detection methods fail catastrophically under this new problem setting;
• We propose an effective algorithm, ALOE, that substantially improves the robustness of
OOD detectors;
• We empirically analyze our method under different settings and optimization objectives, and
provide theoretical insights of our approach.
• We release a code base that integrates the most common OOD detection base-
lines, and our robust OOD detection methods at: https://github.com/jfc43/
robust-ood-detection. We hope this can ensure reproducibility of all methods, and
make it easy for the community to conduct future research on this topic.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we will introduce the traditional OOD detection problem and existing approaches.
2.1 Traditional Out-of-Distribution Detection Problem
OOD detection can be formulated as a canonical binary classification problem. Suppose we have an
in-distribution PX defined on an input space X ⊂ Rn. An OOD classifier G : X 7→ {0, 1} is built
to distinguish whether an input x is from PX (give it label 1) or not (give it label 0).
In testing, the detector G is evaluated on inputs drawn from a mixture distributionMX×Z defined on
X × {0, 1}, where the conditional probability distributionsMX|Z=1 = PX andMX|Z=0 = QX .
We assume that Z is drawn uniformly from {0, 1}. QX is also a distribution defined on X which we
refer to it as out-distribution. We use Wasserstein distance Wd(PX , QX) to measure the distance
between two distributions PX and QX , where d(·, ·) is a distance metric. We say PX and QX are
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sufficiently different if Wd(PX , QX) > ρ, where ρ is a positive constant. We have an assumption
that PX and QX are sufficiently different. We denote by Dtestin an in-distribution test set drawn from
PX , and Dtestout an out-of-distribution test set drawn from QX . The detection error of G(x) evaluated
under in-distribution PX and out-distribution QX is defined by
L(PX , QX ;G) =
1
2
(Ex∼PX I[G(x) = 0] + Ex∼QX I[G(x) = 1]) (1)
In practice, it can be intractable to directly minimize L(PX , QX ;G) due to lack of prior knowledge
on QX . In some cases we assume having access to auxiliary data sampled from a distribution UX
which is different from both PX and QX .
2.2 Existing Approaches
Recently, several approaches propose to detect OOD examples based on different notions of con-
fidence scores from a neural network f(·), which is trained on a dataset Dtrainin drawn from a data
distribution PX,Y defined on X × Y with Y = {1, 2, · · · ,K}. Note that PX is the marginal
distribution of PX,Y . Based on this notion, we describe a few common methods below.
Maximum Softmax Probability (MSP). Maximum Softmax Probability method is as a common
baseline for OOD detection (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016). Given an input image x and a pre-trained
neural network f(·), the softmax output of the classifier is computed by
F (x) =
efi(x)∑K
j=1 e
fj(x)
.
A threshold-based detector G(x) relies on the confidence score S(x; f) = maxi Fi(x) to make
prediction as follows
GMSP(x; γ, f) =
{
0 if S(x; f) ≤ γ
1 if S(x; f) > γ
(2)
where γ is the confidence threshold.
ODIN. The original softmax confidence scores used in Hendrycks & Gimpel (2016) can be over-
confident. ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) leverages this insight and improves the MSP baseline using the
calibrated confidence score instead (Guo et al., 2017). Specifically, the calibrated confidence score is
computed by
S(x;T, f) = max
i
efi(x)/T∑K
j=1 e
fj(x)/T
,
where T ∈ R+ is a temperature scaling parameter. In addition, ODIN applies small noise perturbation
to the inputs
x˜ = x− η · sign(−∇x logS(x;T, f)), (3)
where the parameter η is the perturbation magnitude.
By combining the two components together, ODIN detector GODIN is given by
GODIN(x;T, η, γ, f) =
{
0 if S(x˜;T, f) ≤ γ
1 if S(x˜;T, f) > γ
(4)
In real applications, it may be difficult to know the out-of-distribution samples one will encounter
in advance. The hyperparameters of T and η can be tuned instead on a random noise data such as
Gaussian or uniform distribution, without requiring prior knowledge of OOD dataset.
Mahalanobis. Lee et al. model the features of training data as class-conditional Gaussian distribution,
where its parameters are chosen as empirical class means and empirical covariance of training samples.
Specifically, for a given sample x, the confidence score from the `-th feature layer is defined using
the Mahalanobis distance with respect to the closest class-conditional distribution:
M`(x) = max
c
−(f`(x)− µˆ`,c)T Σˆ−1` (f`(x)− µˆ`,c), (5)
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where f`(x) is the `-th hidden features of DNNs, and µˆ`,c and Σˆ` are the empirical class means and
covariances computed from the training data respectively.
In addition, they use two techniques (1) input pre-processing and (2) feature ensemble. Specifi-
cally, for each test sample x, they first calculate the pre-processed sample x˜` by adding the small
perturbations as in Liang et al. (2017):
x˜` = x+ η · sign(∇xM`(x)), (6)
where η is a magnitude of noise, which can be tuned on the validation data.
The confidence scores from all layers are integrated through a weighted averaging:
∑
` α`M`(x˜`).
The weight of each layer α` is learned through a logistic regression model, which predicts 1 for
in-distribution and 0 for OOD examples. The overall Mahalanobis distance based confidence score is
M(x) =
1
1 + e−(
∑
` α`M`(x˜`)+b)
, (7)
where b is the bias of the logistic regression model. Putting it all together, the final Mahalanobis
detector GMahalanobis is given by
GMahalanobis(x; η, γ, {α`}, b, f) =
{
0 if M(x) ≤ γ
1 if M(x) > γ
(8)
Outlier Exposure (OE). Outlier Exposure (Hendrycks et al., 2018) makes use of a large, unlabeled
auxiliary dataset DOEout drawn from UX to improve out-of-distribution detection. A new classifier,
FOE, parameterized by θ, is trained using the following objective
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∼Dtrainin [− logFy(x)] + λ · Ex∼DOEout [LCE(F (x),UK)],
where F (·) is softmax output of the classification model trained on PX,Y , and UK is the uniform
distribution over K classes. The cross-entropy loss LCE(z, y) = −
∑K
i=1 yi log zi. This objective
regularizes the model F to produce more conservative predictions (uncertainties) on the out-of-
distribution samples. The classifier FOE can be combined with downstream OOD detection methods
(such as MSP or ODIN). The corresponding detectors can be constructed as GMSP(x; γ, FOE), and
GODIN(x;T, η, γ, FOE), respectively.
3 Robust Out-of-Distribution Detection
Traditional OOD detection methods described in Section 2.2 are shown to work well when evaluated
on natural images that are sampled from a sufficiently different distribution than the training data
distribution. However, in this section, we show that existing OOD detectors are extremely brittle
and can fail when we add minimal semantic-preserving perturbations to the inputs. We start by
introducing a novel problem called robust out-of-distribution detection.
Problem Statement. We define Ω(x) to be a set of semantic-preserving perturbations on an input x.
For δ ∈ Ω(x), x+δ has the same semantic label as x. This also means that x and x+δ have the same
distributional membership (i.e. x and x+ δ both belong to in-distribution PX , or out-distribution
QX ).1
A robust OOD classifier G : X 7→ {0, 1} is built to distinguish whether a perturbed input x + δ
is from PX or not. In testing, the detector G is evaluated on perturbed inputs drawn from a
mixture distributionMX×Z defined on X × {0, 1}, where the conditional probability distributions
MX|Z=1 = PX andMX|Z=0 = QX . We assume that Z is drawn uniformly from {0, 1} and PX
is sufficiently different from QX . The detection error of G evaluated under in-distribution PX and
out-distribution QX is now defined by
L(PX , QX ;G,Ω) =
1
2
(Ex∼PX max
δ∈Ω(x)
I[G(x+ δ) = 0] + Ex∼QX max
δ∈Ω(x)
I[G(x+ δ) = 1]) (9)
In practice, it can be intractable to directly minimizeL(PX , QX ;G,Ω) due to lack of prior knowledge
on QX . In some cases we assume having access to auxiliary data sampled from a distribution UX
which is different from both PX and QX .
1Based on our definition, common adversarial examples (Papernot et al., 2016; Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al., 2013) constructed from in-distribution data to fool the image classifier f(x)
should be treated as in-distribution as well.
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Adversarial Attacks on OOD Detection. We describe adversarial attack algorithms that can show
the vulnerability of existing OOD detection approaches. Computing the exact value of detection
error defined in equation (9) requires enumerating all possible perturbations. This can be practically
intractable given the large space of Ω(x) ⊂ Rn. To this end, we propose adversarial attack algorithms
that can find the perturbations in Ω(x) to compute a lower bound.
Specifically, we consider image data and small L∞ norm-bounded perturbations on x since it is
commonly used in adversarial machine learning research (Madry et al., 2017; Athalye et al., 2018).
For data point x ∈ Rn, a set of adversarial perturbations is defined as
B(x, ) = {δ ∈ Rn ∣∣ ‖δ‖∞ ≤  ∧ x+ δ is valid}, (10)
where  is the size of small perturbation, which is also called adversarial budget. x+ δ is considered
valid if the values of x+ δ are in the image pixel value range.
For the OOD detection methods based on softmax confidence score (e.g. MSP, ODIN and OE), we
describe the attack mechanism in Algorithm 1. Specifically, we construct adversarial test examples
by adding small perturbations in B(x, ) so to change the prediction confidence in the reverse
direction. To generate adversarial in-distribution examples, the model is induced to output probability
distribution that is close to uniform; whereas adversarial OOD examples are constructed to induce the
model produce high confidence score. We note here that the adversarial examples here are constructed
to fool the OOD detectors G(x), rather than the image classification model f(x).
Algorithm 1 Adversarial attack on OOD detectors based on softmax confidence score.
input x, F , , m, ξ
output δ
δ ← randomly choose a vector from B(x, )
for t = 1, 2, · · · ,m do
x′ ← x+ δ
if x is in-distribution then
`(x′)← LCE(F (x′),UK)
else
`(x′)← −∑Ki=1 Fi(x′) logFi(x′)
end if
δ′ ← δ − ξ · sign(∇x`(x′))
δ ←∏B(x,) δ′ . projecting δ′ to B(x, )
end for
For the OOD detection methods using Mahalanobis distance based confidence score, we propose
an attack algorithm detailed in Algorithm 2. Specifically, we construct adversarial test examples
by adding small perturbations in B(x, ) to make the logistic regression detector predict wrongly.
Note that in our attack algorithm, we don’t perform input pre-processing to compute the Mahalanobis
distance based confidence score.
Our attack algorithms assume having access to the model parameters, thus they are white-box attacks.
We find that using our attack algorithms, even with very minimal attack strength ( = 1/255 and
m = 10), classic OOD detection methods (e.g. MSP, ODIN, Mahalanobis, OE, and OE+ODIN) can
fail miserably. For example, the false positive rate of OE method can increase by 95.52% under such
attack when evaluated on CIFAR-10 as in-distribution dataset. We provide experimental results in
more detail in Section 5.
4 ALOE: Adversarial Learning with inliner and Outlier Exposure
In this section, we introduce a novel method called Adversarial Learning with inliner and Outlier
Exposure (ALOE) to improve the robustness of the OOD detector G(·) built on top of the neural
network f(·) against input perturbations.
Training Objective. We train our model ALOE against two types of perturbed examples. For
in-distribution inputs x ∈ PX , ALOE creates adversarial inlier within the -ball that maximize the
negative log likelihood. Training with perturbed examples from the in-distribution helps calibrate the
error on inliers, and make the model more invariant to the additive noise. In addition, our method
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Algorithm 2 Adversarial attack on OOD detector using Mahalanobis distance based confidence
score.
input x, M`(·), {α`}, b, , m, ξ
output δ
δ ← randomly choose a vector from B(x, )
for t = 1, 2, · · · ,m do
x′ ← x+ δ
p(x′)← 1
1+e−(
∑
` α`M`(x
′)+b)
if x is in-distribution then
`(x′)← − log p(x′)
else
`(x′)← − log(1− p(x′))
end if
δ′ ← δ + ξ · sign(∇x`(x′))
δ ←∏B(x,) δ′ . projecting δ′ to B(x, )
end for
leverages an auxiliary unlabeled dataset DOEout drawn from UX as used in Hendrycks et al. (2018),
but in a different objective. While OE directly uses the original images x ∈ DOEout as outliers, ALOE
creates adversarial outliers by searching within the -ball that maximize the KL-divergence between
model output and a uniform distribution. The overall training objective of FALOE can be formulated
as a min-max game given by
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∼Dtrainin maxδ∈B(x,)
[− logFθ(x+ δ)y] + λ · Ex∼DOEout maxδ∈B(x,)[LCE(Fθ(x+ δ),UK)]
where Fθ(x) is the softmax output of the neural network.
To solve the inner max of these objectives, we use the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) method
(Madry et al., 2017), which is the standard method for large-scale constrained optimization. The
hyper-parameters of PGD used in the training will be provided in the experiments.
Once the model FALOE is trained, it can be used for downstream OOD detection by combining
with approaches such as MSP and ODIN. The corresponding detectors can be constructed as
GMSP(x; γ, FALOE), and GODIN(x;T, η, γ, FALOE), respectively.
Possible Variants. We also derive two other variants of robust training objective for OOD detection.
The first one performs adversarial training only on the inliers. We denote this method as ADV, which
is equivalent to the objective used in Madry et al. (2017).
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∼Dtrainin maxδ∈B(x,)
[− logFθ(x+ δ)y]
Alternatively, we also considered performing adversarial training on inlier examples while simulta-
neously performing outlier exposure as in Hendrycks et al. (2018). We refer to this variant as AOE
(adversarial learning with outlier exposure).
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∼Dtrainin maxδ∈B(x,)
[− logFθ(x+ δ)y] + λ · Ex∼DOEout [LCE(Fθ(x),UK)]
We provide ablation studies comparing these variants with ALOE in Section 5.
5 Experiments
In this section we perform experiments to answer the following questions:
(Q1) Are classic OOD detection methods (e.g. MSP, ODIN, Mahalanobis, and OE) robust against
semantic-preserving input perturbations?
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(Q2) How does ALOE perform on the robust OOD detection task and the original classification
task, compared to existing approaches?
(Q3) How will the hyper-parameters such as adversarial budget  affect the experimental results?
We perform extensive experiments to answer these questions. In summary, we have the following
findings:
(A1) Classic OOD detection methods such as ODIN, Mahalanobis, and OE fail drastically under
our adversarial attack even with a very small attack budget.
(A2) Our method ALOE can significantly improve the performance of OOD detection under our
adversarial attack compared to the classic OOD detection methods. Also, we observe that the
performance of its variants ADV and AOE is worse than it in this task. And if we combine
ALOE with other OOD detection approaches such as ODIN, we can further improve its
performance. What’s more, ALOE improves model robustness while maintaining almost
the same classification accuracy on clean inputs.
(A3) When we increase the adversarial budget , the attack will be stronger and the robust OOD
detection performance decreases for classic methods. ALOE consistently improves the
performance under different attack strengths.
Next we provide more details.
5.1 Setup
In-distribution Datasets. we use GTSRB (Stallkamp et al., 2012), CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
datasets (Krizhevsky et al., 2009) as in-distribution datasets. The pixel values of all the images are
normalized to be in the range [0,1]. The details of these datasets can be found in the appendix B.1.
Out-of-distribution Datasets. For auxiliary outlier dataset, we use 80 Million Tiny Images (Torralba
et al., 2008), which is a large-scale, diverse dataset scraped from the web. We follow the same
deduplication procedure as in Hendrycks et al. (2018) and remove all examples in this dataset that
appear in CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 to ensure that DOEout and Dtestout are disjoint. For OOD test dataset,
we follow the settings in Liang et al. (2017); Hendrycks et al. (2018). For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100,
we use six different natural image datasets: SVHN, Textures, Places365, LSUN (crop), LSUN
(resize), and iSUN. For GTSRB, we use the following six datasets that are sufficiently different
from it: CIFAR-10, Textures, Places365, LSUN (crop), LSUN (resize), and iSUN. Again, the
pixel values of all the images are normalized to be in the range [0,1]. The details of these datasets can
be found in the appendix B.1.
Architectures and Training Configurations. We use the state-of-the-art neural network architecture
DenseNet (Huang et al., 2017). We follow the same setup as in Huang et al. (2017), with depth
L = 100, growth rate k = 12 (Dense-BC) and dropout rate 0. All neural networks are trained with
stochastic gradient descent with Nesterov momentum (Duchi et al., 2011; Kingma & Ba, 2014).
Specifically, we train Dense-BC with momentum 0.9 and `2 weight decay with a coefficient of 10−4.
For GTSRB, we train it for 10 epochs; for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we train it for 100 epochs.
For in-distribution dataset, we use batch size 64; For outlier exposure with DOEout , we use batch size
128. The initial learning rate of 0.1 decays following a cosine learning rate schedule (Loshchilov &
Hutter, 2016).
Hyperparameters. For ODIN (Liang et al., 2017), we choose temperature scaling parameter T
and perturbation magnitude η by validating on a random noise data, which does not depend on
prior knowledge of out-of-distribution datasets in test. In all of our experiments, we set T = 1000.
We set η = 0.0004 for GTSRB, η = 0.0014 for CIFAR-10, and η = 0.0028 for CIFAR-100. For
Mahalanobis (Lee et al., 2018), we randomly select 1,000 examples from Dtrainin and 1,000 examples
fromDOEout to train the Logistic Regression model and tune η2, where η is chosen from 21 evenly spaced
numbers starting from 0 and ending at 0.004, and the optimal parameters are chosen to minimize the
FPR at TPR 95%. For OE, AOE and ALOE methods, we fix the regularization parameter λ to be
0.5. In PGD that solves the inner max of ADV, AOE and ALOE, we use step size 1/255, number
of steps b255+ 1c, and random start. For our attack algorithm, we set ξ = 1/255 and m = 10 in
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our experiments. The adversarial budget  by default is set to 1/255, however we perform ablation
studies by varying the value.
More experiment settings can be found in the Appendix B.1.
5.2 Evaluation Metrics
We report main results using three metrics described below. In addition, we also evaluate our method
using AURP metric, which is described in Appendix B.2.
FPR at 95% TPR. This metric calculates the false positive rate (FPR) on out-of-distribution examples
when the true positive rate (TPR) is 95%.
Detection Error. This metric corresponds to the minimum mis-detection probability over all possible
thresholds γ, which is minγ L(PX , QX ;G(x; γ)).
AUROC. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve is a threshold-independent metric
(Davis & Goadrich, 2006). It can be interpreted as the probability that a positive example is assigned
a higher detection score than a negative example (Fawcett, 2006). A perfect detector corresponds to
an AUROC score of 100%.
5.3 Results
All the values reported in this section are averaged over six OOD test datasets. We provide detailed
results for each individual dataset in Appendix B.3.
Classic OOD detection methods fail under our attack. As shown in Table 1, although classic
OOD detection methods (e.g. MSP, ODIN, Mahalanobis, OE and OE+ODIN) could perform quite
well on detecting natural OOD samples, their performance drops substantially under the attack (even
with very minimal attack budget ( = 1/255 and m = 10). For the best-performing OOD detection
method (i.e., OE+ODIN), the FPR at 95% TPR increases drastically from 4.17% (without attack) to
99.02% (with attack) when evaluated on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
ALOE improves robust OOD detection performance. As shown in Table 1, our method ALOE
could significantly improve the OOD detection performance under the adversarial attack. For example,
ALOE can substantially improve the AUROC from 34.29% (state-of-the-art: OE+ODIN) to 92.69%
evaluated on the CIFAR-10 dataset. The performance can be further improved when combining
ALOE with ODIN. We observe this trend holds consistently on other benchmark datasets GTSRB
and CIFAR-100 as in-distribution training data. We also find that adversarial training (ADV) or
combining adversarial training with outlier exposure (AOE) yield slightly less competitive results.
To better understand our method, we analyze the distribution of the confidence scores produced by the
OOD detectors on SVHN (out-distribution) and CIFAR-10 (in-distribution). As shown in Figure 1,
OE could distinguish in-distribution and out-of-distribution samples quite well since the confidence
scores are well separated. However, under our attack, the confidence scores of in-distribution samples
move towards 0 and the scores of out-of-distribution samples move towards 1.0, which renders the
detector fail to distinguish in- and out-of-distribution samples. Using our method, the confidence
scores (under attack) become separable and shift toward the right direction. If we further combine
ALOE with ODIN, the scores produced by the detector are even more separated.
Effect of adversarial budget . We further perform ablation study on the adversarial budget  and
analyze how this affects performance. On GTSRB and CIFAR-10 dataset, we perform comparison by
varying  = 1/255, 2/255, 3/255, 4/255. The results are reported in Table 2. We observe that as we
increase , the performance on classic OOD detection methods (e.g. MSP, ODIN, Mahalanobis, OE,
OE+ODIN) drops significantly under our attack: the FPR at 95% TPR reaches almost 100% for all
those methods. We also observe that our methods ALOE (and ALOE+ODIN) consistently improves
the results under our attack compared to those classic methods.
Evaluating on common adversarial examples targeting the image classifier f(x). Our work is
primarily concerned with adversarial examples targeting OOD detectors G(x). This is very different
2Lee et al. uses subset of Dtestout or adversarial examples generated by FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014) as
validation data to tune the hyper-parameters. However, in realistic setting we assume that no knowledge of OOD
test dataset is available. Also based on the robust OOD definition, adversarial examples should be viewed as
in-distribution and therefore not suitable for tuning OOD detectors. Instead, we use a small set of examples from
DOEout to tune those hyper-parameters.
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Figure 1: Confidence score distribution produced by different methods. For illustration purposes, we use
CIFAR-10 as in-distribution and SVHN as out-of-distribution. (a) and (b) compare the score distribution for
Outlier Exposure (Hendrycks et al., 2018), evaluated on clean images and PGD attacked images, respectively.
The distribution overall shift toward the opposite direction under our attack, which causes the method to fail.
Our method ALOE can mitigate the distribution shift as shown in (c). When combined with ODIN (Liang et al.,
2017), the score distributions can be further separable between in- and out-distributions, as shown in (d).
from the common notion of adversarial examples that are constructed to fool the image classifier
f(x). While previous work (Lee et al., 2018) has considered such adversarial examples as OOD, we
argue here that this is contradictory to the typical notion of OOD under the distributional assumption.
Based on our robust definition of OOD detection in Section 3, adversarial examples constructed from
in-distribution data to fool the image classifier f(x) should be treated as in-distribution. To validate
this point, we generate PGD attacked images w.r.t the original classification model f(x) trained on
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 respectively. We measure the performance of OOD detectors G(x) by
reporting 1-FPR (at TPR 95%), which indicates the rate of misclassifying adversarial examples as
out-of-distribution examples. As shown in Table 3, the metric in general is low for both classic and
robust OOD detection methods, which suggests that common adversarial examples are closer to
in-distribution rather than OOD.
Classification performance of image classifier f(x). In addition to OOD detection, we also verify
the accuracy and robustness on the original classification task. The results are presented in table 4.
Robustness measures the accuracy under PGD attack w.r.t the original classification model. We use
adversarial budget  of 1/255 and number of attack steps of 10. Original refers to the vanilla model
trained with standard cross entropy loss on the dataset. On both GTSRB and CIFAR-10, ALOE
improves the model robustness, while maintaining almost the same classification accuracy on the
clean inputs. On CIFAR-100, ALOE improves robustness from 7.29% to 55.97%, albeit dropping the
classification accuracy slightly (3.64%). Overall our method achieves good trade-off between the
accuracy and robustness due to adversarial perturbations.
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Dtestin Method
FPR Detection AUROC FPR Detection AUROC
(95% TPR) Error (95% TPR) Error
↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
without attack with attack ( = 1/255, m = 10)
GTSRB
MSP (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) 1.13 2.42 98.45 97.59 26.02 73.27
ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) 1.42 2.10 98.81 75.94 24.87 75.41
Mahalanobis (Lee et al., 2018) 1.31 2.87 98.29 100.00 29.80 70.45
OE (Hendrycks et al., 2018) 0.02 0.34 99.92 25.85 5.90 96.09
OE+ODIN 0.02 0.36 99.92 14.14 5.59 97.18
ADV (Madry et al., 2017) 1.45 2.88 98.66 17.96 6.95 94.83
AOE 0.00 0.62 99.86 1.49 2.55 98.35
ALOE (ours) 0.00 0.44 99.76 0.66 1.80 98.95
ALOE+ODIN (ours) 0.01 0.45 99.76 0.69 1.80 98.98
CIFAR-
10
MSP (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) 51.67 14.06 91.61 99.98 50.00 10.34
ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) 25.76 11.51 93.92 93.45 46.73 28.45
Mahalanobis (Lee et al., 2018) 31.01 15.72 88.53 89.75 44.30 32.54
OE (Hendrycks et al., 2018) 4.47 4.50 98.54 99.99 50.00 25.13
OE+ODIN 4.17 4.31 98.55 99.02 47.84 34.29
ADV (Madry et al., 2017) 66.99 19.22 87.23 98.44 31.72 66.73
AOE 10.46 6.58 97.76 88.91 26.02 78.39
ALOE (ours) 5.47 5.13 98.34 53.99 14.19 91.26
ALOE+ODIN (ours) 4.48 4.66 98.55 41.59 12.73 92.69
CIFAR-
100
MSP (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) 81.72 33.46 71.89 100.00 50.00 2.39
ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) 58.84 22.94 83.63 98.87 49.87 21.02
Mahalanobis Lee et al. (2018) 53.75 27.63 70.85 95.79 47.53 17.92
OE (Hendrycks et al., 2018) 56.49 19.38 87.73 100.00 50.00 2.94
OE+ODIN 47.59 17.39 90.14 99.49 50.00 20.02
ADV (Madry et al., 2017) 85.47 33.17 71.77 99.64 44.86 41.34
AOE 60.00 23.03 84.57 95.79 43.07 53.80
ALOE (ours) 61.99 23.56 83.72 92.01 40.09 61.20
ALOE+ODIN (ours) 58.48 21.38 85.75 88.50 36.20 66.61
Table 1: Distinguishing in- and out-of-distribution test set data for image classification. We contrast performance
on clean images (without attack) and PGD attacked images. ↑ indicates larger value is better, and ↓ indicates
lower value is better. All values are percentages and are averaged over six OOD test datasets mentioned in
section 5.1. The detail results on each OOD test dataset can be found in Appendix B.3.
Dtestin Method
FPR Detection AUROC FPR Detection AUROC FPR Detection AUROC
(95% TPR) Error (95% TPR) Error (95% TPR) Error
↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
with attack with attack with attack
( = 2/255, m = 10) ( = 3/255, m = 10) ( = 4/255, m = 10)
GTSRB
MSP (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) 99.88 50.00 26.11 99.99 50.00 6.79 99.99 50.00 6.39
ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) 99.23 49.97 27.38 99.83 50.00 6.94 99.84 50.00 6.52
Mahalanobis Lee et al. (2018) 100.00 49.97 26.37 100.00 50.00 8.27 100.00 50.00 7.82
OE (Hendrycks et al., 2018) 96.79 16.09 83.06 99.91 25.36 68.62 99.97 26.37 66.91
OE+ODIN 89.88 15.78 84.56 99.25 24.70 69.71 99.45 25.67 68.02
ADV (Madry et al., 2017) 92.17 11.51 89.92 99.65 18.59 80.85 99.49 18.68 81.17
AOE 7.94 5.36 94.82 16.16 10.38 88.72 38.05 17.95 83.84
ALOE (ours) 4.03 4.19 95.90 10.82 7.64 91.21 16.10 10.10 89.52
ALOE+ODIN (ours) 3.95 4.15 95.72 9.56 6.91 91.08 13.85 9.22 89.44
CIFAR-
10
MSP (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) 100.00 50.00 1.16 100.00 50.00 0.13 100.00 50.00 0.12
ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) 99.73 49.99 5.67 99.98 50.00 1.14 99.99 50.00 1.06
Mahalanobis Lee et al. (2018) 100.00 50.00 5.90 100.00 50.00 1.27 100.00 50.00 1.05
OE (Hendrycks et al., 2018) 100.00 50.00 5.99 100.00 50.00 1.52 100.00 50.00 1.48
OE+ODIN 100.00 50.00 8.89 100.00 50.00 2.76 100.00 50.00 2.69
ADV (Madry et al., 2017) 99.94 36.57 56.01 99.89 39.64 49.88 99.96 40.57 48.02
AOE 91.79 35.08 66.92 99.96 39.53 54.43 98.40 37.37 59.16
ALOE (ours) 75.90 23.36 83.26 83.14 31.54 73.46 82.53 29.92 75.52
ALOE+ODIN (ours) 68.80 20.31 85.92 79.19 28.04 77.88 78.46 27.55 78.83
Table 2: Distinguishing in- and out-of-distribution test set data for image classification. ↑ indicates larger
value is better, and ↓ indicates lower value is better. All values are percentages. The in-distribution datasets are
GRSRB and CIFAR-10. All the values reported are averaged over six out-of-distribution test datasets described
in section 5.1.
6 Analysis
The interesting questions related to our method are: (1) why unlabeled auxiliary data from UX helps?
(2) why the robustness of the detector G on UX generalizes to a different distribution QX?
To get some intuition for these questions, we adopt the domain adaption framework (Ben-David et al.,
2010). Recall that in domain adaptation there are two domains s, t, each being a distribution over
the input space X and label space {0, 1}. A classifier is trained on s then applied on t. We view our
OOD detection problem as classification, where the source domain s is PX with labels 1 and UX
with labels 0, and the target domain t is PX with labels 1 and QX with label 0.
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Dtestin Method
1-FPR
(95% TPR)
CIFAR-
10
MSP (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) 10.75
ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) 4.02
Mahalanobis (Lee et al., 2018) 7.13
OE (Hendrycks et al., 2018) 12.22
OE+ODIN 12.95
ADV (Madry et al., 2017) 7.69
AOE 11.18
ALOE (ours) 8.85
ALOE+ODIN (ours) 8.71
CIFAR-
100
MSP (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) 0.06
ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) 0.74
Mahalanobis Lee et al. (2018) 4.29
OE (Hendrycks et al., 2018) 4.36
OE+ODIN 5.21
ADV (Madry et al., 2017) 3.14
AOE 8.08
ALOE (ours) 7.32
ALOE+ODIN (ours) 7.06
Table 3: Distinguishing adversarial examples generated by PGD attack on the image classifier f(x). 1-FPR
indicates the rate of misclassifying adversarial examples as out-of-distribution examples. For PGD attack, we
choose  as 1/255 and the number of attack steps as 10. All values are percentages.
Dtestin Method Classifcation Robustness
Accuracy w.r.t image classifer
GTSRB
Original 99.33% 88.47%
OE 99.38% 83.99%
ADV 99.23% 97.13%
AOE 98.82% 94.14%
ALOE 98.91% 94.58%
CIFAR-10
Original 94.08% 25.38%
OE 94.59% 28.94%
ADV 92.97% 84.81%
AOE 93.35% 78.60%
ALOE 93.89% 84.02%
CIFAR-100
Original 75.26% 7.29%
OE 74.45% 7.84%
ADV 70.58% 54.58%
AOE 72.56% 52.96%
ALOE 71.62% 55.97%
Table 4: The image classification accuracy and robustness of different models on original tasks (GTSRB,
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100). Robustness measures the accuracy under PGD attack w.r.t the original classification
model.
Denote the loss of detector G on point (x, y) as:
L(G, x, y; Ω) := max
δ∈Ω(x)
I[G(x+ δ) 6= y].
Denote the loss of G in the source domain as:
Rs(G) :=
1
2
Ex∼PX ,y=1L(G, x, y; Ω) +
1
2
Ex∼UX ,y=0L(G, x, y; Ω)
and similarly define the loss Rt(G) of G in the target domain. Following Ben-David et al. (2010),
define (a variant) of the divergence of QX and UX w.r.t. the hypothesis class G as
dG(QX , UX) = sup
G,G′∈G
v(G,G′;QX)− v(G,G′;UX)
where
v(G,G′;D) = Ex∼D,y=0(LΩ(G, x, y)− LΩ(G′, x, y))
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Figure 2: An illustration example to explain why UX helps to get a good detector Gr . With UX , we can
prune away hypotheses Gr for any r ≥ 1.9. Thus, the resulting detector Gr can detect OOD samples from QX
successfully and robustly.
is the loss difference of G and G′ on distribution D. The divergence upper bounds the change of the
hypothesis loss difference between QX and UX . If it is small, then for any G,G′ ∈ G where G has a
smaller risk than G′ in UX , we know that G will also have a smaller (or not too larger) risk than G′
in QX . That is, if the divergence is small, then the ranking of the hypotheses w.r.t. the loss is roughly
the same in both distributions. This rank-preserving property thus makes sure that a good hypothesis
learned in UX will also be good for QX .
Now we show that, if dG(QX , UX) is small (i.e., QX and UX are aligned w.r.t. the class G), then a
detector G with small loss in the source domain will also have small loss in the target domain.
Theorem 1. For any G ∈ G,
Rt(G) ≤ inf
G∗∈G
Rt(G∗) +Rs(G) +
1
2
dG(QX , UX).
Proof. See the Appendix A.
The test error of the detector is bounded by three terms: the best error, the error on the training
distributions, and the divergence between QX and UX . Assuming that there exists a ground-truth
detector with a small test error, and that the optimization can lead to a small training error, the test
error is then characterized by the divergence. So in this case, as long as the rankings of the hypotheses
(according to the error) on QX and UX are similar, detectors learned on UX can generalize to QX .
An illustration example. In this example, the in-distribution PX is uniform over the disk around
the origin in R2 with radius 1, UX is uniform over the disk around (0, 3) with radius 1, and QX
is uniform over the disk around (3, 0) with radius 1. Assume the adversary budget is  = 0.1,
i.e., Ω = {‖δ‖2 ≤ 0.1}. The hypothesis class for the detector contains all functions of the form
Gr(x) = I[‖x‖2 ≥ r] with parameter r. See Figure 2.
The example first shows the effect of the unlabeled data: UX helps to prune away hypotheses Gr for
any r ≥ 1.9. Furthermore, it also shows how learning over UX can generalize to QX . Although QX
and UX have non-overlapping supports, UX help to calibrate the error of the hypotheses so that any
good detector trained on PX and UX can be used for distinguishing PX and QX . Formally, the dG is
small in Theorem 1.
The analysis also shows the importance of training on perturbed instances from the unlabeled data
UX . Not using perturbation is equivalent to using Ω = {0}. In this case, the analysis shows that
it only guarantees the error on unperturbed instances from QX , even if QX and UX has small
divergence and the optimization gives small training error.
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7 Related Work
Out-of-Distribution Detection. Various papers (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016; Lakshminarayanan
et al., 2017) have reported that discriminative neural networks can produce overconfident predictions
on out-of-distribution inputs. Liang et al. propose a method which can improve performance of
OOD detectors using calibrated score (Guo et al., 2017). In addition, they make the maximum
softmax probability more discriminative between out-of-distribution and in-distribution examples by
pre-processing input data with small perturbations. Some methods also modify the neural networks
by re-training or fine-tuning on some auxiliary anomalous data that are or realistic (Hendrycks
et al., 2018) or artificially generated by GANs (Lee et al., 2017). Many other works (Subramanya
et al., 2017; Malinin & Gales, 2018; Bevandic´ et al., 2018) also regularize the model to have lower
confidence on anomalous examples . In this paper, we show that existing OOD detection methods
can be easily fooled by adding small adversarial perturbations. Unlike previous work, we are the first
to investigate the robust version of the out-of-distribution problem.
Density Estimation. Generative models (Dinh et al., 2016; Kingma & Welling, 2013; Rezende et al.,
2014; Van den Oord et al., 2016; Tabak & Turner, 2013) can be alternative approaches for detecting
OOD examples, as they directly estimate the in-distribution density and can declare a test sample
to be out-of-distribution if it lies in the low-density regions. However, as shown by Nalisnick et al.,
deep generative models can assign a high likelihood to out-of-distribution data, which urges caution
against using deep generative models to detect out-of-distribution inputs. Yet, deep generative models
can detect out-of-distribution inputs when using alternative metrics (Choi & Jang, 2018), likelihood
ratio (Ren et al., 2019; Serra` et al., 2019), and modified training technique (Hendrycks et al., 2018).
Recently, Pope et al. show that flow-based generative models are extremely sensitive to two types of
adversarial attacks: one that minimizes the likelihood scores of in-distribution samples, while the
other that maximizes the likelihood scores of out-of-distribution ones.
Adversarial Robustness. Although the detectors based on deep models perform quite well on
many OOD detection tasks, they might not be robust against minimal input perturbations since the
behaviors of neural networks have been showed to be very brittle if we add small perturbations to the
inputs. A well-known phenomenon of adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2014) has received
great attention in recent years. Many defense methods have been proposed to address this problem.
One of the most effective methods is adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017) which uses robust
optimization techniques to render deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. Another
brittleness of deep learning models is their interpretation is fragile (Ghorbani et al., 2019): adding
small input perturbations will make deep learning models generate totally different explanations
for their predictions while maintaining their correct predictions. A method called robust attribution
regularization (Chen et al., 2019), which also uses robust optimization, is proposed to solve this
problem. In this paper, we show that the OOD detectors built from deep models are also very brittle
under small perturbations, and propose a method to mitigate this issue using techniques from robust
optimization.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a novel and challenging problem, Robust Out-of-Distribution Detection,
and propose an adversarial attack algorithm to evaluate the robustness of classic OOD detection
methods under this new problem setting. We find that state-of-the-art OOD detection methods can fail
catastrophically under such an attack. We then take a first step to solve this challenge by proposing
an effective algorithm called ALOE, which can substantially improve the robust OOD detection
performance. We empirically analyze our method under different parameter settings and optimization
objectives, and provide theoretical insights behind our approach. Future work involves exploring
alternative semantic-preserving perturbations beyond adversarial attacks.
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Supplementary Material
A Proof of Theorem 1
We have
Rt(G) = Rt(G∗) +Rt(G)−Rt(G∗) (11)
= Rt(G∗) +Rs(G)−Rs(G∗) (12)
+ [(Rt(G)−Rt(G∗))− (Rs(G)−Rs(G∗))]. (13)
The last term is
(Rt(G)−Rt(G∗))− (Rs(G)−Rs(G∗)) (14)
= (Rt(G)−Rs(G))− (Rt(G∗)−Rs(G∗)) (15)
=
1
2
Ex∼QX ,y=0(L(G, x, y; Ω)− L(G∗, x, y; Ω)) (16)
− 1
2
Ex∼UX ,y=0(L(G, x, y; Ω)− L(G∗, x, y; Ω))] (17)
=
1
2
[v(G,G∗;QX)− v(G,G∗;UX)] (18)
≤ 1
2
dG(QX , UX). (19)
Therefore,
Rt(G) ≤ Rt(G∗) +Rs(G) + 1
2
dG(QX , UX). (20)
Taking inf over G∗ ∈ G completes the proof.
B More Details of Experiments
B.1 More Experiment Settings
Software and Hardware. We run all experiments with PyTorch and NVDIA GeForce RTX 2080Ti
GPUs.
Number of Evaluation Runs. We run all experiments once with fixed random seeds.
In-distribution Dataset. We provide the details of in-distribution datasets below:
1. CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. The CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009) have
10 and 100 classes respectively. Both datasets consist of 50,000 training images and 10,000
test images.
2. GTSRB. The German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) (Stallkamp et al.,
2012) is a dataset of color images depicting 43 different traffic signs. The images are not
of a fixed dimensions and have rich background and varying light conditions as would be
expected of photographed images of traffic signs. There are about 34,799 training images,
4,410 validation images and 12,630 test images. We resize each image to 32 × 32. The
dataset has a large imbalance in the number of sample occurrences across classes. We use
data augmentation techniques to enlarge the training data and make the number of samples in
each class balanced. We construct a class preserving data augmentation pipeline consisting
of rotation, translation, and projection transforms and apply this pipeline to images in the
training set until each class contained 10,000 training examples. This new augmented dataset
containing 430,000 samples in total is used as Dtrainin . We randomly select 10,000 images
from original test images as Dtestin .
OOD Test Dataset. We provide the details of OOD test datasets below:
1. SVHN. The SVHN dataset Netzer et al. (2011) contains 32 × 32 color images of house
numbers. There are ten classes comprised of the digits 0-9. The original test set has 26,032
images. We randomly select 1,000 images for each class from the test set to form a new test
dataset containing 10,000 images for our evaluation.
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2. Textures. The Describable Textures Dataset (DTD) Cimpoi et al. (2014) contains textural
images in the wild. We include the entire collection of 5640 images in DTD and downsample
each image to size 32× 32.
3. Places365. The Places365 dataset Zhou et al. (2017) contains large-scale photographs of
scenes with 365 scene categories. There are 900 images per category in the test set. We
randomly sample 10,000 images from the test set for evaluation and downsample each image
to size 32× 32.
4. LSUN (crop) and LSUN (resize). The Large-scale Scene UNderstanding dataset (LSUN)
has a testing set of 10,000 images of 10 different scenes Yu et al. (2015). We construct two
datasets, LSUN-C and LSUN-R, by randomly cropping image patches of size 32 × 32 and
downsampling each image to size 32× 32, respectively.
5. iSUN. The iSUN Xu et al. (2015) consists of a subset of SUN images. We include the entire
collection of 8925 images in iSUN and downsample each image to size 32× 32.
6. CIFAR-10. We use the 10,000 test images of CIFAR-10 as OOD test set for GTSRB.
B.2 Additional Evaluation Metric
AUPR. It is the Area under the Precision-Recall curve, which is another threshold independent
metric Manning et al. (1999); Saito & Rehmsmeier (2015). The PR curve is a graph showing the
precision=TP/(TP+FP) and recall=TP/(TP+FN) against each other. The metric AUPR-In and AUPR-
Out denote the area under the precision-recall curve where in-distribution and out-of-distribution
images are specified as positives, respectively.
B.3 Complete Experimental Results
We report the performance of OOD detectors on each of the six OOD test datasets in Table 5 (GTSRB),
Table 6 (CIFAR-10) and Table 7 (CIFAR-100).
For different adversarial budget , We train different models of ADV, AOE and ALOE. The clas-
sification performance of the training methods (Original, OE, ADV, AOE, ALOE) under different
adversarial budget  is reported in Table 8.
3We observe that the performance of Mahalanobis detector on Places365 dataset (without attack) is worse
than other datasets. For example, when evaluated on model trained with CIFAR-10 dataset, the FPR at 95% TPR
is as high as 90.84%. To check if we tune the hyper-parameters of Mahalanobis detector properly, we run the
original code with the pre-trained model provided by Lee et al. on CIFAR-10 vs. Places365, which uses a subset
of Places365 test data as validation data to tune the hyper-parameters optimally. However, we remark that the
result under such optimal hyperparameter tuning is still abnormal, with FPR 84.99%.
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Dtestout Method
FPR Detection AUROC AUPR AUPR FPR Detection AUROC AUPR AUPR
(95% TPR) Error In Out (95% TPR) Error In Out
↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
without attack with attack ( = 1/255, m = 10)
LSUN-C
MSP 0.56 2.04 98.91 98.71 98.53 97.44 33.48 63.00 54.81 59.64
ODIN 0.75 1.67 99.31 98.70 99.35 81.67 33.45 61.34 51.76 66.21
Mahalanobis 0.62 2.31 98.56 98.78 95.27 100.00 32.16 68.03 66.47 59.47
OE 0.00 0.39 99.92 99.94 99.86 26.37 7.65 95.62 96.87 90.88
OE+ODIN 0.00 0.53 99.92 99.94 99.88 18.91 7.90 96.27 96.16 94.08
ADV 1.30 2.71 98.78 98.14 98.23 18.94 7.18 94.67 91.79 91.70
AOE 0.00 0.74 99.83 99.87 99.74 2.47 3.31 98.17 98.44 95.83
ALOE 0.00 0.60 99.69 99.82 99.26 1.48 2.61 98.79 99.09 96.40
ALOE+ODIN 0.00 0.62 99.69 99.82 99.28 1.66 2.66 98.70 98.42 96.78
LSUN-R
MSP 0.40 2.01 98.80 98.94 97.99 99.14 21.21 79.90 79.61 68.63
ODIN 0.39 1.46 99.46 99.28 99.36 73.00 18.67 85.16 80.80 80.06
Mahalanobis 0.49 2.39 98.63 99.14 95.31 100.00 23.18 78.17 81.15 66.47
OE 0.00 0.17 99.98 99.98 99.96 4.68 3.86 97.89 98.63 95.38
OE+ODIN 0.00 0.15 99.98 99.98 99.97 1.62 3.19 98.88 99.21 98.05
ADV 0.79 2.52 99.02 98.60 98.44 12.30 5.87 96.07 95.16 92.19
AOE 0.00 0.38 99.90 99.93 99.82 0.00 1.16 98.78 99.31 96.34
ALOE 0.00 0.26 99.86 99.90 99.78 0.00 0.95 99.35 99.63 97.73
ALOE+ODIN 0.00 0.26 99.86 99.90 99.79 0.00 0.88 99.47 99.69 98.17
iSUN
MSP 0.82 2.23 98.52 98.06 97.82 98.86 21.56 79.19 77.18 68.38
ODIN 0.92 1.76 99.09 98.07 99.12 72.71 19.46 83.94 77.86 79.35
Mahalanobis 0.61 2.44 98.63 99.03 95.25 100.00 23.26 78.52 80.81 67.24
OE 0.00 0.13 99.98 99.98 99.97 5.48 3.89 97.76 98.56 95.08
OE+ODIN 0.00 0.12 99.98 99.98 99.98 1.73 3.18 98.80 99.16 97.87
ADV 1.54 2.97 98.66 98.05 98.06 16.21 6.77 94.98 92.41 91.08
AOE 0.00 0.40 99.90 99.92 99.83 0.02 1.18 98.76 99.30 96.27
ALOE 0.00 0.25 99.82 99.88 99.71 0.00 0.95 99.29 99.60 97.40
ALOE+ODIN 0.00 0.24 99.83 99.88 99.73 0.00 0.87 99.41 99.66 97.88
Textures
MSP 3.85 3.96 96.65 91.11 97.41 93.14 29.10 67.90 58.35 65.24
ODIN 5.05 4.19 96.22 89.46 97.62 73.74 28.80 67.07 55.61 72.70
Mahalanobis 3.03 3.83 97.39 94.24 94.78 100.00 32.98 66.53 59.58 61.13
OE 0.12 0.66 99.82 99.39 99.81 39.15 7.26 94.99 95.91 89.18
OE+ODIN 0.12 0.64 99.80 99.21 99.81 19.98 6.99 96.21 96.07 93.32
ADV 3.07 3.83 97.59 94.18 97.60 26.49 9.02 92.28 85.94 90.03
AOE 0.02 0.90 99.79 99.71 99.69 4.93 4.84 97.43 97.06 95.18
ALOE 0.02 0.75 99.70 99.68 99.40 2.23 3.13 98.44 98.32 96.17
ALOE+ODIN 0.04 0.78 99.68 99.60 99.38 2.27 3.24 98.23 96.89 96.53
Places365
MSP 0.60 2.11 98.91 98.94 98.47 98.59 24.28 76.10 72.14 66.47
ODIN 0.52 1.65 99.44 99.19 99.43 76.28 22.74 79.77 71.52 76.74
Mahalanobis 1.45 3.08 98.25 98.56 94.86 100.00 33.47 65.85 65.73 56.85
OE 0.00 0.31 99.93 99.94 99.87 37.96 6.25 95.23 97.08 88.37
OE+ODIN 0.00 0.34 99.93 99.95 99.88 20.40 6.05 96.54 97.66 92.40
ADV 0.73 2.43 99.06 98.98 98.46 15.73 6.08 95.82 95.38 91.72
AOE 0.00 0.66 99.88 99.91 99.81 0.70 2.28 98.49 99.07 95.75
ALOE 0.00 0.40 99.75 99.85 99.48 0.11 1.54 98.94 99.37 96.38
ALOE+ODIN 0.00 0.41 99.75 99.85 99.47 0.10 1.53 99.06 99.42 96.86
CIFAR-
10
MSP 0.56 2.16 98.91 98.82 98.57 98.39 26.51 73.53 67.90 65.11
ODIN 0.89 1.84 99.31 98.89 99.32 78.25 26.08 75.16 65.33 73.79
Mahalanobis 1.68 3.15 98.26 98.43 94.96 100.00 33.83 65.62 64.05 57.25
OE 0.00 0.36 99.92 99.94 99.85 41.45 6.49 95.07 96.97 88.26
OE+ODIN 0.00 0.37 99.92 99.94 99.86 22.18 6.25 96.39 97.58 92.26
ADV 1.28 2.84 98.83 98.72 98.24 18.08 6.77 95.14 93.76 91.14
AOE 0.00 0.64 99.88 99.91 99.80 0.80 2.52 98.47 99.03 95.73
ALOE 0.00 0.39 99.73 99.84 99.41 0.12 1.63 98.91 99.36 96.27
ALOE+ODIN 0.00 0.39 99.73 99.84 99.39 0.14 1.64 99.03 99.41 96.77
Table 5: Distinguishing in- and out-of-distribution test set data for image classification. We use GTSRB as Dtestin .
We contrast performance on clean images (without attack) and PGD attacked images. All values are percentages.
↑ indicates larger value is better, and ↓ indicates lower value is better.
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Dtestout Method
FPR Detection AUROC AUPR AUPR FPR Detection AUROC AUPR AUPR
(95% TPR) Error In Out (95% TPR) Error In Out
↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
without attack with attack ( = 1/255, m = 10)
LSUN-C
MSP 36.19 9.77 95.26 96.31 93.90 99.94 50.00 9.51 31.03 32.63
ODIN 5.81 5.18 98.82 98.90 98.74 97.86 49.89 24.90 35.59 37.22
Mahalanobis 1.86 3.00 99.39 99.21 99.40 80.16 34.23 66.35 57.16 68.36
OE 0.95 2.67 99.41 99.54 99.21 99.98 50.00 28.11 36.77 37.08
OE+ODIN 1.89 3.08 99.38 99.43 99.27 99.39 50.00 37.60 39.99 43.25
ADV 55.91 16.43 90.38 91.86 88.32 91.72 26.45 75.32 80.75 66.49
AOE 4.99 4.87 98.86 99.00 98.66 71.17 21.76 84.96 86.67 81.13
ALOE 3.44 4.20 98.81 99.06 98.37 43.55 12.02 93.30 94.91 88.51
ALOE+ODIN 2.50 3.73 99.07 99.25 98.72 31.21 10.60 94.83 95.76 92.24
LSUN-R
MSP 37.09 10.13 95.09 96.20 93.55 100.00 50.00 20.08 34.63 34.44
ODIN 2.02 3.23 99.50 99.53 99.47 83.12 39.82 63.22 58.83 64.96
Mahalanobis 5.90 5.33 98.44 98.12 98.55 86.18 42.69 52.53 46.99 58.85
OE 2.57 3.74 98.87 99.14 98.34 100.00 50.00 30.89 38.12 37.99
OE+ODIN 1.07 2.65 99.35 99.45 99.09 98.84 45.45 48.59 45.55 49.45
ADV 66.89 18.41 88.10 90.34 84.73 99.88 30.56 67.79 76.04 56.30
AOE 8.22 5.65 98.07 98.52 96.85 93.86 22.07 81.96 85.85 71.77
ALOE 4.90 4.76 98.49 98.78 97.86 60.94 13.85 91.32 93.35 84.49
ALOE+ODIN 3.47 4.16 98.74 98.97 98.18 46.37 12.16 92.96 94.20 88.45
iSUN
MSP 40.11 10.54 94.72 96.08 92.85 99.97 50.00 20.01 34.14 34.58
ODIN 2.96 3.74 99.35 99.39 99.33 81.11 40.73 60.54 54.68 64.68
Mahalanobis 9.56 7.13 97.62 97.07 97.91 80.92 41.57 50.74 45.57 60.91
OE 2.94 3.91 98.86 99.12 98.37 100.00 50.00 30.56 38.98 36.8
OE+ODIN 1.14 2.65 99.31 99.43 99.04 98.76 45.91 47.43 44.74 49.13
ADV 70.28 20.83 85.85 88.22 81.86 99.95 33.18 64.91 72.04 54.61
AOE 9.23 5.94 97.91 98.36 96.78 94.25 23.01 81.09 85.24 70.20
ALOE 6.03 5.45 98.32 98.62 97.70 63.64 14.94 90.49 92.20 84.45
ALOE+ODIN 4.91 4.79 98.57 98.83 98.00 9.74 13.18 92.10 93.26 87.75
Textures
MSP 67.17 19.11 86.99 86.07 83.04 99.98 50.00 5.09 31.35 30.95
ODIN 57.36 22.97 84.80 82.60 84.76 98.60 49.96 11.69 32.47 32.71
Mahalanobis 45.71 23.08 82.67 73.78 86.30 91.31 47.31 17.88 34.27 40.91
OE 6.05 5.28 98.43 98.67 98.01 99.96 50.00 28.04 36.33 37.74
OE+ODIN 6.74 5.69 97.58 96.56 97.88 97.47 45.70 38.44 40.27 47.00
ADV 70.83 20.97 85.40 86.96 81.00 99.20 34.67 63.21 69.27 52.76
AOE 9.23 5.94 97.91 98.36 96.78 92.20 32.23 71.22 71.12 64.18
ALOE 4.57 4.66 98.67 98.87 98.32 40.09 13.18 92.65 93.27 89.25
ALOE+ODIN 3.78 4.36 98.77 98.87 98.56 30.01 12.11 93.64 93.23 92.23
Places365
MSP 63.69 17.90 88.42 88.19 85.04 100.00 50.00 2.15 30.49 31.17
ODIN 63.69 17.90 88.42 88.19 85.04 100.00 50.00 6.43 31.32 31.34
Mahalanobis 90.84 41.73 60.90 59.08 58.92 99.94 50.00 0.73 30.77 30.70
OE 10.21 7.22 97.11 96.73 97.00 100.00 50.00 13.72 32.25 33.11
OE+ODIN 10.71 7.70 96.91 96.43 96.96 99.73 50.00 19.94 34.28 34.83
ADV 66.66 19.72 86.72 87.37 84.03 99.94 33.78 63.32 69.87 52.44
AOE 16.20 8.88 96.32 95.97 96.07 95.88 30.54 72.52 72.92 63.59
ALOE 10.21 7.43 97.13 96.59 97.20 55.35 17.90 88.05 87.11 83.81
ALOE+ODIN 9.37 7.02 97.27 96.69 97.35 46.94 16.52 89.23 87.40 87.17
SVHN
MSP 65.77 16.90 89.19 90.53 85.45 99.99 50.00 5.23 31.27 31.07
ODIN 43.04 17.13 90.45 90.23 90.19 100.00 50.00 3.95 30.98 31.03
Mahalanobis 32.20 14.06 92.16 90.56 90.98 100.00 50.00 7.04 31.55 31.33
OE 4.09 4.21 98.55 98.92 97.95 100.00 50.00 19.47 33.71 34.53
OE+ODIN 3.50 4.08 98.76 98.85 98.53 99.95 50.00 13.73 32.86 32.80
ADV 71.37 18.99 86.90 89.17 82.59 99.97 31.70 65.85 74.42 53.86
AOE 10.13 6.58 98.08 98.36 97.52 86.10 26.51 78.57 82.16 70.23
ALOE 3.65 4.30 98.62 98.93 98.08 60.40 13.28 91.74 93.85 85.84
ALOE+ODIN 2.85 3.88 98.87 99.12 98.41 45.26 11.79 93.35 94.74 89.72
Table 6: Distinguishing in- and out-of-distribution test set data for image classification. We use CIFAR-10
as Dtestin . We contrast performance on clean images (without attack) and PGD attacked images. All values are
percentages. ↑ indicates larger value is better, and ↓ indicates lower value is better. 3
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Dtestout Method
FPR Detection AUROC AUPR AUPR FPR Detection AUROC AUPR AUPR
(95% TPR) Error In Out (95% TPR) Error In Out
↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
without attack with attack ( = 1/255, m = 10)
LSUN-C
MSP 66.06 24.67 83.33 85.59 81.34 100.00 50.00 6.84 31.83 30.96
ODIN 14.33 8.56 97.36 97.52 97.24 94.06 49.23 45.63 45.02 49.14
Mahalanobis 1.10 2.26 99.63 99.46 99.58 89.58 38.18 59.86 52.20 60.62
OE 23.20 10.68 95.80 96.26 95.38 100.00 50.00 5.19 30.90 31.43
OE+ODIN 20.25 9.97 96.54 96.87 96.40 98.97 50.00 27.62 36.93 36.89
ADV 72.85 26.85 80.69 82.59 78.77 97.89 39.09 55.92 64.86 49.38
AOE 35.00 14.88 92.98 93.41 92.78 86.88 34.75 69.36 72.96 65.65
ALOE 40.06 15.40 92.27 92.76 91.76 79.72 29.69 76.68 78.83 73.99
ALOE+ODIN 30.60 12.79 94.35 94.77 93.94 70.76 25.02 82.50 84.18 80.40
LSUN-R
MSP 86.39 39.29 64.99 65.31 63.50 100.00 50.00 1.52 30.83 30.74
ODIN 52.71 20.65 87.50 88.00 86.41 99.68 50.00 26.14 36.25 36.23
Mahalanobis 24.55 13.48 92.07 88.74 93.43 96.11 49.73 20.17 34.65 37.65
OE 64.82 22.67 84.73 85.92 82.25 100.00 50.00 3.50 31.36 30.57
OE+ODIN 47.49 17.82 90.24 91.11 89.18 99.75 50.00 25.91 36.14 36.08
ADV 87.97 34.90 69.68 72.27 65.85 99.95 46.18 38.57 50.67 40.22
AOE 62.83 26.76 81.20 80.77 81.64 96.09 47.04 51.10 54.15 49.10
ALOE 67.72 28.13 78.94 78.09 78.45 94.37 45.67 55.25 55.79 53.05
ALOE+ODIN 64.15 25.97 81.35 80.35 81.12 91.41 42.00 60.40 59.58 58.18
iSUN
MSP 87.37 41.04 62.77 62.59 61.74 100.00 50.00 1.45 30.80 30.75
ODIN 58.69 22.59 85.41 86.12 83.94 99.73 50.00 23.99 35.45 35.51
Mahalanobis 29.67 16.06 89.60 84.71 91.85 91.72 48.10 23.32 35.55 42.45
OE 67.22 23.85 83.55 84.73 81.24 100.00 50.00 3.12 30.48 31.36
OE+ODIN 51.00 18.70 89.30 90.17 88.09 99.79 50.00 24.35 35.58 35.57
ADV 90.41 38.17 65.51 67.77 61.46 100.00 48.66 35.47 46.06 39.18
AOE 69.41 29.68 77.58 76.65 77.97 97.77 48.72 47.20 50.46 46.04
ALOE 73.38 31.01 74.92 72.04 75.35 95.98 47.81 51.36 51.59 49.83
ALOE+ODIN 70.22 28.84 77.54 75.28 77.39 93.31 44.55 56.52 55.08 54.63
Textures
MSP 86.30 33.84 70.04 68.83 65.87 100.00 50.00 1.59 32.50 29.11
ODIN 83.60 35.06 68.91 64.47 67.88 99.76 49.97 10.26 32.02 31.97
Mahalanobis 83.85 44.25 35.19 38.84 52.04 97.32 49.17 3.97 31.43 33.13
OE 63.08 22.15 85.39 86.82 83.21 99.98 50.00 3.66 30.67 31.30
OE+ODIN 61.55 23.08 85.02 85.47 84.43 98.46 50.00 19.31 34.05 34.71
ADV 90.25 36.37 66.67 64.54 62.80 100.00 48.40 36.48 46.66 38.01
AOE 62.95 23.49 83.91 84.04 82.84 96.21 44.59 51.13 55.81 48.67
ALOE 59.25 23.14 85.08 85.71 84.22 90.06 40.34 62.16 65.62 59.16
ALOE+ODIN 57.27 21.45 86.58 86.91 85.93 86.61 36.97 67.10 69.31 64.52
Places365
MSP 83.43 31.46 74.09 75.41 70.01 100.00 50.00 0.81 30.78 30.68
ODIN 81.11 29.97 76.00 76.35 72.17 99.99 50.00 9.25 31.73 31.82
Mahalanobis 96.21 49.23 49.43 50.26 48.72 99.99 50.00 0.10 30.69 30.69
OE 60.69 20.69 86.70 87.52 84.63 100.00 50.00 1.03 30.73 30.76
OE+ODIN 62.94 20.06 87.09 88.42 84.61 99.99 50.00 12.36 32.31 32.45
ADV 84.38 31.96 73.73 75.76 70.26 99.99 44.52 40.04 53.00 40.77
AOE 57.94 22.57 85.71 86.01 85.05 98.11 43.09 52.73 59.26 47.92
ALOE 55.00 21.73 86.64 87.00 86.11 92.55 38.69 64.07 68.39 58.54
ALOE+ODIN 52.38 19.04 88.94 89.84 87.74 89.91 33.68 70.14 74.05 64.14
SVHN
MSP 80.76 30.44 76.14 79.56 72.24 100.00 50.00 2.14 31.29 30.39
ODIN 62.61 20.82 86.59 88.44 84.26 99.97 50.00 10.87 31.99 32.18
Mahalanobis 87.09 40.52 59.18 53.01 60.18 100.00 50.00 0.10 30.69 30.69
OE 59.92 16.27 90.21 92.39 86.23 100.00 50.00 1.12 30.88 30.62
OE+ODIN 42.32 14.71 92.64 93.68 91.45 100.00 50.00 10.58 31.97 32.10
ADV 86.94 30.78 74.31 78.72 69.08 100.00 42.29 41.58 57.07 41.29
AOE 71.87 20.80 86.04 88.70 81.25 99.68 40.22 51.28 63.00 45.85
ALOE 76.54 21.96 84.46 87.58 77.98 99.39 38.32 57.69 67.38 49.78
ALOE+ODIN 76.27 20.18 85.75 88.88 79.27 99.00 34.98 62.99 71.53 53.43
Table 7: Distinguishing in- and out-of-distribution test set data for image classification. We use CIFAR-100
as Dtestin . We contrast performance on clean images (without attack) and PGD attacked images. All values are
percentages. ↑ indicates larger value is better, and ↓ indicates lower value is better.
Dtestin Method  = 2/255  = 3/255  = 4/255Accuracy Robustness Accuracy Robustness Accuracy Robustness
GTSRB
Original 99.33% 65.46% 99.33% 47.91% 99.33% 47.20%
OE 99.38% 57.76% 99.38% 38.48% 99.38% 38.20%
ADV 98.50% 93.01% 96.58% 88.04% 96.13% 87.79%
AOE 97.90% 82.87% 95.32% 68.88% 95.27% 64.16%
ALOE 98.20% 82.76% 95.12% 63.41% 95.14% 60.97%
CIFAR-
10
Original 94.08% 2.17% 94.08% 0.10% 94.08% 0.09%
OE 94.59% 4.28% 94.59% 0.78% 94.59% 0.71%
ADV 91.20% 77.35% 90.10% 70.81% 89.93% 70.33%
AOE 92.56% 70.58% 87.13% 66.35% 89.76% 69.82%
ALOE 92.58% 75.64% 90.84% 67.66% 90.90% 69.63%
Table 8: The classification accuracy and robustness of different models with various adversarial budget .
Robustness measures the accuracy under PGD attack with number of attack steps of 10.
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